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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. PERSON AGGRIEVED BY EXISTING REGULATION NOT REQUIRED TO
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BY PETITIONING FOR PROMULGATION
OF NEW REGULATION BEFORE PURSUING JUDICIAL REMEDY
In Charleston Television, Inc. v. South Carolina Budget & Con-
trol Board' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a person af-
fected by an existing administrative regulation need not participate in
available rulemaking procedures before challenging the regulation in a
declaratory judgment action. This holding clarifies a point of state ad-
ministrative law and brings South Carolina in line with other states
2
and the Model State Administrative Procedure Act.
3
The dispute arose in the context of a state procurement proceed-
ing. For many years South Carolina Educational Television (ETV) had
been interested in having its Charleston station broadcast from a 2000
foot tower, the maximum height allowed under federal regulations. In
1985-86 the General Assembly allocated funds for the project. Two lo-
cal television stations, WCBD (Charleston Television) and WCSC (Tall
Tower), planned to construct separate 2000 foot towers, and ETV
solicited lease proposals from both stations.4
1. 301 S.C. 468, 392 S.E.2d 671 (1990), rev'g 296 S.C. 444, 373 S.E.2d 892 (Ct. App.
1988).
2. See Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, Court Holds Administrative Reme-
dies Not Exhausted Until Person Aggrieved by Existing Regulation Petitions for Pro-
mulgation of New Regulation, 41 S.CL. REv. 1 (1989). This analysis of the court of ap-
peals treatment of the controversy collects and discusses cases from other jurisdictions.
3. U~us. ADmiN. PROcEDuRE AcT, 15 U.L.A. 1 (1981). See infra note 24 and accom-
panying text.
4. For a detailed discussion of the factual background to this controversy, see
1
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The South Carolina Consolidated Procurement Code5 exempts the
leasing of real property for governmental bodies from the general re-
quirement of competitive sealed bidding.6 The procurement section
governing these leases contains, however, a provision which states that
the South Carolina Budget and Control Board (the Board) "shall pro-
mulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this Section which
shall include . . . [p]rocedures for competitive bidding where feasi-
ble."7 The Board failed to promulgate the required regulation, but did
promulgate regulation 19-445.2120, 8 which provides procedures for the
negotiation of leases when competitive bidding is not feasible.9 In this
case the Board determined that competitive bidding was not feasible
and awarded the lease to Tall Tower. 1° Although Charleston Televi-
sion's bid was lower, ETV cited technical differences to explain its
preference for the Tall Tower proposal."
Charleston Television challenged the lease award in two ways.
First, it petitioned the Chief Procurement Officer to set aside the lease
award. 2 The Chief Procurement Officer upheld the lease. On appeal
the Procurement Review Panel ordered the lease rebid because ETV
did not make certain technical information available to Charleston
Television. The circuit court affirmed, but the supreme court reversed
in Tall Tower, Inc. v. South Carolina Procurement Review Panel.3
The Tall Tower court held that ETV was not required to provide tech-
Charleston Television, Inc. v. South Carolina Budget & Control Bd., 296 S.C. 444, 450-
54, 373 S.E.2d 892, 895-98 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 301 S.C. 468, 392 S.E.2d 671 (1990).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35-10 to -5270 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1990).
6. See id. § 11-35-1510 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
7. Id. § 11-35-1590(3) (emphasis added).
8. S.C. CODE REGS. 19-445.2120 (1976). The regulation provides in part-
No governmental body shall contract for the lease, rental, or use of non-
State-owned real property without approval of the Division of General Ser-
vices, except as specified in Subsection C. Requests shall be directed to the
Division of General Services, Real Property Management Section. The Division
of General Services shall negotiate all leases of non-State-owned real property
unless the governmental body has been certified by the Materials Management
Office.
rd.
9. See Charleston Television, Inc. v. South Carolina Budget & Control Bd., 301
S.C. 468, 475, 392 S.E.2d 671, 675 (1990).
10. Charleston Television, Inc. v. South Carolina Budget & Control Bd., 296 S.C.
444, 453, 373 S.E.2d 892, 897 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 301 S.C. 468, 392 S.E.2d 671 (1990).
11. Id. at 452, 373 S.E.2d at 897.
12. In pursuing this avenue, Charleston Television followed the protest resolution
procedure established in the South Carolina Consolidated Procurement Code for "[a]ny
actual ... bidder ... aggrieved in connection with the ... award of a contract." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-35-4210(1) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
13. 294 S.C. 225, 363 S.E.2d 683 (1987).
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nical information to Charleston Television. 14
Second, Charleston Television requested a declaratory ruling from
the Board, pursuant to section 1-23-150(a), 15 that regulation 19-
445.2120 was ineffective because the Board did not have the power to
promulgate it. The Board found that competitive bidding was not fea-
sible in the instant case, that it had the authority to promulgate regu-
lation 19-445-2120, and that the regulation applied to the lease
16
Charleston Television then sought a declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive relief under section 1-23-150(b).'7
The trial court held that the lease was void because of the Board's
failure to promulgate a regulation, as mandated by section 11-35-1590,
to provide procedures for competitive bidding when feasible. 18 The
court of appeals reversed and held that Charleston Television was
barred from seeking a judicial remedy. 9 Judge Gardner based his opin-
ion on the grounds that Charleston Television had failed to exhaust its
administrative remedy under section 1-23-126. 20 The supreme court re-
versed and held that it is not necessary for a party to exhaust its rem-
edy under section 1-23-126 prior to seeking relief under section 1-23-
150.21 The supreme court concluded that competitive bidding was fea-
14. Id. at 233-34, 363 S.E.2d at 687-88.
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-150(a) (Law. Co-op. 1986). Section 1-23-150 governs ap-
peals contesting the authority of a state agency to promulgate a regulation, and subsec-
tion (a) states: "Any person may petition an agency in writing for a declaratory ruling as
to the applicability of any regulation of the agency or the authority of the agency to
promulgate a particular regulation. The agency shall, within thirty days after receipt of
such petition, issue a declaratory ruling thereon." Id.
16. Charleston Television, Inc. v. South Carolina Budget & Control Bd., 296 S.C.
444, 453, 373 S.E.2d 892, 897 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 301 S.C. 468, 392 S.E.2d 671 (1990).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-150(b) (Law. Co-op. 1986). This section provides:
After compliance with the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, any
person affected by the provisions of any regulation of an agency may petition
the Circuit Court for a declaratory judgment and/or injunctive relief if it is
alleged that the regulation or its threatened application interferes with or im-
pairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of
the plaintiff or that the regulation exceeds the regulatory authority of the
agency. The agency shall be made a party to the action.
Id.
18. Charleston Television, 296 S.C. at 454, 373 S.E.2d at 898.
19. Id. at 455-56, 373 S.E.2d at 898-99.
20. Id. Section 1-23-126 states: "An interested person may petition an agency in
writing requesting the promulgation, amendment or repeal of a regulation. Within thirty
days after submission of such petition, the agency shall either deny the petition in writ-
ing (stating its reasons for the denial) or shall initiate the action in such petition." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-23-126 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
21. Charleston Television, Inc. v. South Carolina Budget & Control Bd., 301 S.C.
468, 472, 392 S.E.2d 671, 673 (1990).
1991]
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sible in this case and ordered that the lease must be rebid.22
The supreme court noted that the comments to section 6 of the
1961 version of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act (the
Model Act), from which the General Assembly fashioned section 1-23-
126, "shed no light on the purpose of this section. '2 The court ob-
served, however, that the comments to section 5-107 of the 1981 Model
Act indicate that the drafters of the 1961 Model Act did not intend
that a petitioner be required to exhaust this remedy before seeking ju-
dicial review.
24
The supreme court's holding is not inconsistent with the adminis-
trative law principle that administrative remedies must be exhausted
before a judicial remedy is pursued.25 Administrative remedies may be
unduly burdensome or provide inadequate relief for the affected per-
son. 6 The supreme court simply recognized that this controversy
presented a situation in which the exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies was possible but not desirable.2 7 A requirement that Charleston
Television petition for a regulation establishing procedures for compet-
itive bidding when feasible would have been burdensome and time-
consuming. By the time Charleston Television could have pursued its
22. Id. at 474-75, 392 S.E.2d at 674-75. The supreme court apparently reached this
conclusion by equating competition with competitive bidding. The court reasoned that
because competition existed, competitive bidding was clearly feasible. Id. at 474, 392
S.E.2d at 674. However, the record before the court contained a finding that competitive
bidding was not feasible in this case. Charleston Television, 296 S.C. at 459, 373 S.E.2d
at 901 (Bell, J., concurring). In his opinion concurring in the court of appeals decision,
Judge Bell noted this unchallenged finding and argued that the lease should be upheld,
not because Charleston Television failed to exhaust its remedy under section 1-23-126,
but because Charleston Television lacked standing as an "affected person" under section
1-23-150(b) to challenge regulation 19-445.2120. Id. at 460, 373 S.E.2d at 901.
23. Charleston Television, 301 S.C. at 472, 392 S.E.2d at 673.
24. Id. Section 5-107 provides in part that:
A person may file a petition for judicial review under this Act only after
exhausting all administrative remedies available within the agency whose ac-
tion is being challenged and within any other agency authorized to exercise
administrative review, but:
(1) a petitioner for judicial review of a rule need not have participated in
the rule-making proceeding upon which that rule is based, or have petitioned
for its amendment or repeal.
UNIF. ADMIN. PROCEDURE AcT § 5-107, 15 U.L.A. 116 (1981). The comment to the section
states, "Paragraph (1), like the 1961 Revised Model Act, imposes no exhaustion require-
ment on the petitioner for judicial review of a rule." Id. comment.
25. See K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 20.01 (3d ed. 1972) ("The statement
the courts so often repeat in their opinions-that judicial relief must be denied until
administrative remedies have been exhausted-is seriously at variance with the
holdings.").
26. See id. § 20.07.
27. Charleston Television, 301 S.C. at 472, 392 S.E.2d at 673.
[Vol. 43
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remedy under section 1-23-150(b), a declaratory ruling would have
been too late and injunctive relief would have been meaningless.
Margaret M. Fox
II. ISSUANCE OF SANITARY LANDFILL PERMIT REQUIRES FINDINGS
CONCERNING FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF AREA
In Adams v. South Carolina Department of Health & Environ-
mental Control28 the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the
Department of Health and Environmental Control's (DHEC) decision
to issue a permit for the operation of a sanitary landfill in Greenwood
County. The court based its reversal on DHEC's failure to make find-
ings regarding "what the future development of the area will be and
whether the proposed landfill will conform with that development. '29
DHEC issued Greenwood County a permit to operate a sanitary
landfill off McKenzie Road. Twelve residents of the surrounding area
appealed the decision to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed
DHEC's decision, and the residents appealed. The residents alleged
that the proposed site failed to satisfy certain location requirements
for sanitary landfills. Regulation 61-70(V)(A), 30 promulgated by
DHEC, establishes the minimum site location requirements for sani-
tary landfills and states: "The disposal location site shall: 1. be easily
accessible to collection vehicles, private autos, and where applicable,
transfer vehicles; . . . 4. conform with the surrounding environment;
[and] 5. conform with future development of the area."31
The residents argued that the proposed site failed to satisfy any of
these requirements. The court of appeals found no merit in the resi-
dents' assertion that the site would not be easily accessible.3 2 The court
similarly found no merit in the residents' allegation that the proposed
landfill would not conform to the surrounding environment."3 As to the
residents' third argument that the proposed cite did not "conform with
the future development of the area," the court concluded that because
DHEC made no findings on the future development of the area,
DHEC's decision to issue the permit could not stand."'
The court's reversal was proper because DHEC failed to follow its
28. 399 S.E.2d 788 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
29. Id. at 790.
30. S.C. CoDE REGs. 61-70(V)(A) (1976).
31. Id.
32. Adams, 399 S.E.2d at 789.
33. Id. at 789-90.
34. Id. at 790.
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own regulation in issuing the permit."5 DHEC promulgated this regula-
tion to protect public health, safety, and welfare. DHEC must meet all
requirements for the issuance of a sanitary landfill permit before it
may issue the permit. These requirements include making findings on
the future development of the area and determining whether the pro-
posed site conforms with that development.
Significantly, the court remanded the case and limited DHEC to
the existing record in determining whether the site would conform with
future development of the area.36 In order to make an informed predic-
tion about the future development of the area and, therefore, an in-
formed decision about whether to issue the permit, DHEC may need to
gather additional evidence not available in the record. For the benefit
of the county and the nearby residents, the court should permit DHEC
to study the area thoroughly before DHEC decides whether it should
issue a permit for a sanitary landfill.
Julia C. Archer
III. GREAT DEFERENCE GIVEN TO DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY
In Hampton Nursing Center v. State Health & Human Services
Finance Commission" the South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a
consolidated final administrative decision by the South Carolina
Health and Human Services Finance Commission (the Commission)
that imputed available interest income to three nursing home facilities
based on interest-free shareholder loans made by the facilities. The
Commission's ruling reduced the allowable reimbursement to the facili-
ties for interest expense.38 In affirming the administrative agency's or-
der, the court of appeals followed the traditional rule that accords
great deference to the interpretations by an agency of the laws it is
statutorily charged with implementing.40 Hampton Nursing Center is
35. See Triska v. Department of Health & Envtl. Control, 292 S.C. 190, 194, 355
S.E.2d 531, 533 (1987) ("DHEC must also follow its own regulations .... Any action
taken by DHEC outside of its statutory and regulatory authority is null and void.") (ci-
tations omitted).
36. Adams, 399 S.E.2d at 790.
37. 399 S.E.2d 434 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
38. Id. at 435.
39. The Commission is the single state agency in South Carolina designated for im-
plementation of the Medicaid Program. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-6-30(1) (Law. Co-op.
1976).
40. See Hampton Nursing Center, 399 S.E.2d at 436 (citing South Carolina Police
Officers Retirement Sys. v. City of.Spartanburg, 301 S.C. 188, 391 S.E.2d 239 (1990)).
[Vol. 43
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instructive as an interpretation of the parameters of the South Caro-
lina Administrative Procedure Act,41 under which the nursing homes
brought the appeal.
The Commission routinely contracts with nursing facilities in
South Carolina to provide services to Medicaid patients.42 The nursing
homes are reimbursed for expenses associated with the care of these
patients through a complex formula incorporated into their provision
contracts.43 These contracts also incorporate guidelines provided by a
government publication entitled the Provider Reimbursement Man-
ual.44 The three nursing homes involved in Hampton Nursing Center
had these contracts with the state. As the court of appeals noted, "A
cardinal principle of Medicare and Medicaid law is that reasonable
costs are allowable, 'excluding therefrom any part of incurred cost
found to be unnecessary.' ",45 Furthermore, the court pointed out that
costs related to interest expense "are deemed to be necessary only
where a loan is made to 'satisfy a financial need of the provider.' "46
Moreover, "interest expense is 'reduced by investment income.' ,47
In the present case Hampton, Cypress, and Bayview nursing
homes each claimed reimbursement for interest expense incurred in
providing Medicaid services. After securing loans resulting in interest
expense, the nursing homes each made loans to some of their respec-
tive shareholders free of interest, payable on demand. The funds used
in the making of these loans did not come from the funds received
through the loans that generated the interest expense. The nursing
homes were each reimbursed for their services. Consistent with the
normal practice of the state, the Office of the State Auditor conducted
audits of the nursing homes to determine if the reimbursement paid to
the homes was allowable under the applicable federal and state guide-
lines contained in their contracts with the state. Upon discovering that
the nursing homes issued interest-free shareholder loans during the
same period in which they received reimbursement for interest ex-
pense, the auditor notified the facilities that the otherwise reimburs-
able interest expense would be reduced by the value of the available
interest which could have been earned on the shareholder loans.48
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310 to -400 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
42. See id. § 44-6-50(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (authorizing Commission to "[c]ontract
for other operational components of programs administered under this chapter as con-
sidered appropriate").
43. Hampton Nursing Center, 399 S.E.2d at 436.
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395X(v)(1)(A) (1988)).
46. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.153(b)(2)(i) (1990)).
47. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.153(b)(2)(iii) (1990)).
48. Id. at 435.
1991]
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The nursing homes each sought administrative review of the audi-
tor's decision and, in a consolidated hearing, a panel of the Coniunis-
sion affirmed the challenged audit adjustment. The nursing homes
sought judicial review in circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the
Commission's order. The nursing homes appealed.49
The court of appeals noted that section 1-23-380 of the South Car-
olina Administrative Procedure Act5" sets forth very limited and spe-
cific guidelines for judicial review of agency decisions.51 The court also
noted the widely accepted rule that decisions of the agenck designated
to implement a particular statutory program must be accorded great
deferenceB2 The agency is usually most familiar with the complexities
of the program it administers.
Within the framework of the six-part test set forth in section 1-23-
380, two primary issues faced the court. First, the court had to decide
whether the Commission's order exceeded the authority of the Com-
mission. The nursing homes argued that no statutory authority exists
that would allow the imputation of interest income for the interest-free
shareholder loans.5 3 The court of appeals conceded that the issue was
one of first impression in South Carolina, but cited several federal de-
cisions allowing "offset of available interest income against interest ex-
pense."'s These cases supported the Commission's decision.55
49. Id.
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
51. Hampton Nursing Center, 399 S.E.2d at 436 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380
(Law. Co-op. 1986)). Section 1-23-380(g) states:
The court shall not substitute its judgement for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact .... The court may reverse or
modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
SC. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(g) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
52. Hampton Nursing Center, 399 S.E.2d at 436 (citing South Carolina Police Of-
ficers Retirement Sys. v. City of Spartanburg, 301 S.C. 188, 391 S.E.2d 239 (1990)).
53, Brief of Appellants at 7.
54. Hampton Nursing Center, 399 S.E.2d at 436 (siting Forsyth County Hosp.
Auth., Inc. v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 668 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Research Medical Center
v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1982); Portland Adventist Medical Center v. Heck-
ler, 561 F. Supp. 1092 (D.D.C. 1983) (mem.); Gosman v. United States, 573 F.2d 31 (Ct.
Cl. 1978)).
55. See id. at 437.
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Second, the court had to determine whether evidence existed in
the administrative record from which the hearing panel of the Com-
mission could have determined that the nursing homes retained access
to the income. The court correctly held that the nursing homes' ac-
knowledgement that the interest-free loans to the shareholders were
payable on demand constituted evidence from which the panel could
reasonably conclude that the nursing homes had access to the funds for
the purposes of investment or debt reduction. 6
The court ignored, however, an argument put forth by the nursing
homes. The nursing homes asserted that the Commission's decision to
impute investment income on shareholder loans "retroactively penal-
izes the nursing homes for engaging in an activity which has never
been prohibited by State or Federal law and regulations or the contract
between the State and the nursing homes. '57 Simply put, the nursing
homes argued that if the Commission wished to impute investment in-
come on shareholder loans, then it should do so through the adminis-
trative rulemaking process and not through ad hoc adjudication.58
It is unfortunate that the court of appeals chose not to take the
opportunity to address this argument. It is a well-established principle
of administrative law that "the choice ... between proceeding by gen-
eral rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in
the informed discretion of the administrative agency. ' 5 There are
many legitimate considerations that might lead an agency to change or
expand existing policy through adjudication rather than proceeding
through the rulemaking process. The agency may seek to avoid public
criticism by hiding new policies in adjudications of which only a lim-
ited number of people are aware, or the issues may be too intricate to
be adequately addressed in the broad-based setting of rulemaking. Al-
ternatively, the agency may not even have considered the need for a
new policy until late in the adjudicatory process.60
There is, however, very little if any case law in South Carolina that
acknowledges this inherent agency discretion. The court of appeals
perhaps missed an opportunity to create, meaningful precedent in the
area of administrative law in South Carolina.
John P. Hutchins
56. Id.
57. Reply Brief of Appellants at 2.
58. Id.
59. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (citing Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 421 (1942)).
60. See id. at 202-03.
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